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Abstract 
Behavioral finance is a new discipline that has emerged to explain the anomalies in the financial markets (ex: 
the succession of speculative bubbles and stock market crashes). It is based on two assumptions namely the 
irrationality of investors and limit arbitration. Behavioral finance is based on prospect theory and the 
psychological biases. 
In this paper we will present first the behavioral finance and its state of research. Secondly, we will present 
the results of the survey that was conducted with a sample composed of managers of equity securities 
portfolios exercising in the management companies in Morocco and Moroccan traders and which deals with 
psychological biase that affect their decisions the most. The results showed that capital portfolio managers 
and Moroccan traders are influenced by psychological biases in their decision-making.  
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Introduction 
The classical or modern finance under the neo-classical economy was based on the maximization of utility 
expectancy, the hypothesis of lack of arbitrage opportunity and especially the assumption of efficiency of the 
markets constituting the core of financial theory. However, the succession of speculative bubbles and stock 
market crashes was the source of the criticism towards the postulate rationality-efficiency and led to the 
questioning of classical finance. In this sense, the psychological explanation of the financial markets led 
thereafter to the emergence of Behavioral Finance in the studies on finance which was developed from the 
perspective of the humanities. Behavioral finance, while drawing inspiration from psychology, could hardly 
neglect the fundamental work of the pioneers of modern portfolio theory such as Markowitz and Sharpe, but 
it has focused on individuals and ways of collecting and using information and has, thus, incorporated 
individual aspects of the decision-making process into financial markets. 
This article will first report the theoretical generalities related to the birth of behavioral finance; its 
fundamentals to present then the most known psychological biases, namely, overconfidence, anchoring bias, 
herd behavior or sheep behavior, representativeness bias and mental accounting, in addition to a new bias 
embedded in the study of the cultural bias. Later, it will present the results of the study that focused on 
psychological biases that influence the decisions of managers of equity securities and traders. 
1- Theoretical part: 
1.1. Presentation of behavioral finance 
It was at the beginning of the 1980s that a new approach, proposing to study the financial phenomena by 
including the behavioral dimension, was born with the first contributions   of a small group of professors of 
finance, namely: Hersh Shefrin, Robert Schiller, Werner De Brondt and Richard Thaler. They focused on the 
study of investors’ behaviors and market movements without any theoretical bias. They began to exchange 
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their research with psychologists such as Daniel Kanheman and Amos Tversky; two specialists in the study 
of individual behaviors in risky environments. According to Stracca (2004), behavioral finance is a new trend 
that rejects Savage's axioms whose objective is the maximization of preferences considered as the main goal 
of an economic agent. Frankfurter and McGoun (2001), for their part, admit that investors behave like humans, 
individually or collectively (with their qualities and flaws), and not as a homogenous group of rational 
individuals as classic finance presents them. And since they are so, it should be necessary to study how they 
react and make their decisions. The fields of psychology, sociology and anthropology have presented different 
models of human behaviors that offer tools for analysts for a better understanding of market events. 
After more than thirty-five years, behavioral finance or “La Finance Comportementale” has ceased to be a 
marginal research trend and has emerged as the most paradigm to replace the neoclassical approach that has 
dominated the “area” since 1950s. This modern approach, so-called Neoclassical, focused on two fundamental 
assumptions: the rationality of investors and the efficiency of market. Known by the weight of its two pillars, 
the standard approach has been able to model market balance at the micro level so that agents concerned with 
this balance reach their optimum with portfolios that maximize the profit-risk ratio. At the macroeconomic 
level, it has proved that market prices perfectly illustrate the fundamental values according to the availability 
of information. Behavioral finance, on the other hand, has taken a radically different approach. Its point of 
departure was to test the rationality of the agents and the associated axioms. The conclusions of psychologists 
and other members of this discipline were as follow: 
- The axioms of independence and transitivity are often overwhelmed by individual decisions; 
- Investors have a herding behavior; 
- Investors do not follow the rule of BAYES. 
- Investors are overconfident; 
- Investors simplify complex choices with rules and shortcuts called heuristics 1 
Drawing on psychology, behavioral finance empirically observes the actual behavior of investors and 
compares them to price changes in the markets. These are the repetitions of observations that led to the 
criticism of the neoclassical theory inviting finance as a whole to change its vision. 
Behavioral finance thus considers the study of the activity of the financial markets from the point of view of 
the social sciences by borrowing a broad repertoire of research methods and accepting the complexity of 
human behavior. Behavioral finance has not neglected the fundamental work of Markowitz, Sharpe, or other 
pioneers of modern portfolio theory, but has incorporated individual aspects of the decision-making process 
into financial markets. In other sense, it is interested in the individuals and the means to collect and use 
information. 
According to Christophe SCHINCKUS (2009), «It should be noted that there is currently no true unified 
theory of behavioral finance. The current one is still unstable and incomplete». Schinckus also explains that 
despite the various researches carried out   in this field as heterogeneous as they are, they all relies on three 
hypotheses. 
The existence of behavioral biases: It is through the different observations made in the laboratory by 
cognitive psychologists that behavioral biases appeared. They constitute the fundamental hypothesis of 
behavioral finance. These biases account for the differences between the observed behavior of agents and the 
rational behavior on which the standard financial economy is based. Each individual has his own perception 
of things that gets simplified with heuristics. These simplifying heuristics represent an internal characteristic 
in all economic agents. 
- The impact of environmental data on investors' decision-making: Classical finance describes the 
financial environment as being transparent, unlike the behavioral finance which assumes that the environment 
is opaque, which leads to perception bias. 
- The hypothesis of inefficiency of the financial markets: inefficiency is opposed to the classical theory of 
finance and attacks the main foundation of the latter which is the rationality of the investors. Several studies 
                                                     
1 A heuristic describes principles and methods that make it possible to formulate judgments or likelihood assessments in a simpler way. This concept 
is central in behavioral finance because it allows to understand how the operators deviate from the rational agent. 
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have shown that individuals make mistakes in the way they process information. Classical finance is mainly 
criticized for its psychological dimension, in other words, for the so-called rational behavior of investors. 
-The foundations of the behavioral theory: Behavioral finance is based on perspective theory and 
psychological bias. In this article, we will dive only through psychological purpose of the study that will be 
processed later. 
-The heuristics and cognitive biases: Heuristics are strategies for simplifying the decision-making process. 
Without realizing it, human beings use it when faced with decisions whose conditions are uncertain (when the 
future is unpredictable) or complex (when the amount of information is very large). Decision makers often 
use these heuristics to make quick decisions. Shah and Oppenheimer (2008) define them as: «rules of thumb 
or mental shortcuts designed to reduce the effort involved in accomplishing a task, primarily by taking into 
consideration less information». Tversky and Kahneman (1974) state that «heuristics are certainly useful, but 
they sometimes lead to serious and systematic errors». They consider them as "prediction or estimation errors" 
which they refer to as bias. In literature, biases, which are usually assumed to be cognitive, are considered as 
reasoning errors or, more specifically, as errors in the processing of information. These errors are characterized 
by a distortion or deformation effect on the decision-maker's assessment of reality and his judgment. 
The classical approach to decision-making explains that a cognitive bias lead, by definition, to a decision that 
is not rational because it is not based on valid or perfect information. The latter does not necessarily imply 
that the chosen decision is biased or   has negative consequences. According to Bazerman (1990), « the 
ultimate success or failure of a decision usually depends on several factors, some of which are beyond the 
control of the decision-maker». The theory of heuristic principles, developed by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974), states that agents do not possess the cognitive abilities required to be able to make decisions on the 
financial markets in a rational way. These individuals operate shortcuts of reasoning to simplify reality in 
order to make more comprehensiblemodels. Their choices are not always in conformity with what is foreseen 
by the hypothesis of perfect rationality. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1974), a heuristic is a cognitive 
strategy that saves time and makes inferences acceptable to the individual although they may be wrong. When 
making decisions, individuals opt for simplifying rules instead of embarking on the proper evaluation process. 
In this sense, the heuristics studied by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) are: the representativeness heuristic, 
the anchoring heuristic and the availability heuristic. 
-The representativeness heuristic: 
In a complex situation of decision-making, individuals often refer to mental shortenings rather than carrying 
out lengthy analytic treatments as stated by Yates (1990). Representativeness is the generalization of a 
situation from a particular known case. Indeed, individuals tend to evaluate the occurrence of a certain future 
event by the degree to which it resembles a recent observed phenomenon. Kahneman and Tversky (1974) 
define the basic assumption on which the representativeness heuristic is based: « The agents evaluate the 
probability of an uncertain event or sample by its degree of similarity between the fundamental 
properties of the sample and its parent population, and by the way in which it reflects the salient 
features of the process by which it has been generated». In other words, if individuals base their decisions 
on similarities, they diverge from rational reasoning. These authors explain that a person follows the 
representativeness heuristic if he evaluates the probability of an uncertain event or a sample by the degree to 
which it is similar in its essential properties to the mother population, and respects the main characteristics of 
the process by which it is produced. Essentially, the representativeness bias is based on stereotypes to form 
irrational opinions quickly (Shefrin, 2005). Based on representativeness, investors tend to overlook the basic 
probabilities and follow the similarities observed with other typical or representative events. The 
representativeness heuristic is very important but can nevertheless cause serious bias like the neglect of base 
rates and of sample size. 
Base rate neglect: This bias explains the tendency of individuals to not consider all available information and 
to miss the statistical data and probabilities of a situation by choosing elements that are irrelevant but easier 
to access. 
Neglect of sample size: The individual here tends to generalize a situation from a small sample that he 
considers to be representative of a larger set. The individual often neglects considering the "sample size" 
factor. In his book "Behavioral Finance," Susskind takes the example of an analyst who gives a four-times in 
a row forecast that has been confirmed by the market, proving that he is part of the "good analysts" group, 
and that these tips are not representative of all "bad advice". Debondt and Thaler (1985) claim that this 
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heuristic leads to phenomena of over-reactions of stock prices: individuals believe   that a stock price that 
shows a constant upward trend represents a good approximation of its future course. This will generate an 
over-reaction of analysts following the positive results. 
-Anchoring bias: Hirsheilfer (2001) defines anchoring as "a phenomenon in which agents tend to be 
excessively influenced in their estimates by an arbitrary quantity mentioned in the formulation of the problem, 
even when these quantities are clearly meaningless". According to Edward (1968), «it is a mental process by 
which people give more importance to their previous views or predictions to the detriment of new 
information». This bias describes the fact that individuals base their estimates on a given problem based on a 
data taken as reference. Indeed, these individuals overweight past information to the detriment of recent 
information. This implies that the weight they assign to past data is too high and that new information cannot 
have an impact on decision-making. Mussweiler and Strack (2000) addressed the question of the relationship 
between uncertainty and anchoring phenomena. They said that when uncertain individuals have to analyze a 
situation, they tend to build their judgment based on familiar reference points. In 2002, Mussweiler and Welch 
show that investors tend to consider stock market extremes as benchmarks in their analyzes. 
-Availability heuristic: The heuristic of availability was also put forward by the famous authors Kahnman 
and Tversky in 1974. This is a method of reasoning based on the immediate availability of information. 
Individuals who use this heuristic tend to associate a frequency or probability with an event based on facility 
with which examples or associations of such an event come to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This 
heuristic refers to the ease with which examples (or identical cases) are available in memory.  Pouget (2000) 
states that «Subjects using this heuristic rule evaluate the probability of an event by the ease with which 
examples or similar cases come to mind. » Barber and Odean (2008) studied the impact of published 
information on the behavior of individual and institutional investors. They showed that when investors decide 
to buy stocks, they tend to look only at stocks that have recently caught their attention (stocks with high trading 
volumes, stocks that appeared in the media, high yield securities). The authors also showed that institutional 
investors are less sensitive to availability heuristics than individual investors. 
- Overconfidence: Several studies in economics have shown that individuals tend to overstate their abilities 
and knowledge which leads them to underestimate the risk of a random variable. This is known as 
overconfidence bias. This latter is manifested by a very natural tendency to think that one’s abilities (or 
knowledge) are more extensive than they actually are6. Debont and Thaler argue that this is the most important 
discovery in the field of decisional psychology. Overconfident individuals believe much more in their own 
evaluation and do not care about the thoughts of others, which implies underestimating the variance of their 
precision error. According to Shiller (1998), individuals will continue to make the same mistakes as when 
they are repeated and will have important consequences. This will lead them to review their behavior, which 
will certainly imply a lack of confidence. Several studies have been done to determine the origins of this 
overconfidence and we distinguish: 
The over-optimism:  In fact, the research carried out in this direction has shown that man is by nature known 
for his optimistic nature and will tend to overestimate the expectations of the assets gains he holds in his 
portfolio. "The over-optimism is a feeling related to the attribution of greater chances to the realization 
of the favorable events compared to the objective probability of occurrence" (Ben Bouheni, 2009)7. The 
over-confidence pushes individuals to take risks in the markets. They overestimate their own abilities. This 
generalized tendency brings with it an illusion of controlling events. 
The better than average effect: According to Greenwald (1980), Taylor and Brown (1988), overconfidence 
can be manifested by an overestimation of one’s own abilities compared to others, sometimes referring to "the 
effect better than the average”. Several studies have shown that people often rate themselves as "above 
average", that is, smarter, more athletic, healthier, etc., than the average (Alicke et al., 1995, Heine and 
Lehman, 1997; Kruger and Dunning, 1999). This unrealistic positive self-esteem may lead to unrealistic 
optimism about the chances of achieving positive results (Weinstein, 1980). 
-The poor/bad Calibration: Another manifestation of overconfidence is the tendency to overestimate the 
accuracy of the information which is known as poor calibration. Several studies have been conducted on this 
matter. In this sense, we quote as an example: 
-The study carried out by Sol and Klayman (2004) showed that the bad calibration is identified by very narrow 
confidence intervals. 
- The work done by Benos, Odean, Daniel et al in 1998, showed that in a context of financial market with 
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information asymmetry, the bad calibration leads to excessively aggressive transaction strategies and poor 
performance. 
- The study developed by Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) showed that investors in their anticipation of the 
expected gains use "the law of small numbers" and are also subject to auto-attribution bias. 
-Overconfidence in the financial markets: On the stock market, overconfidence means that investors are 
sure to understand the market well and are able to anticipate its short- term fluctuations: the sale and purchase 
of securities is very frequent because one believes he knows the securities that the market will favor in the 
short-term. In portfolio management, a person takes a position without first conducting detailed analysis, 
because overconfidence often results in the non-use of available information.  It is also possible that the 
intensive use of it can lead to overconfidence. In addition, the positions taken are even more risky as their last 
operations proved more successful. 
-The mimetic behavior: Mimicry, also called "sheep behavior" or “herd behavior”, is defined as a set of 
behaviors that exhibit a correlation. Sheep behaviors are equated with the opposite of overconfidence. The 
investor tends to follow the actions of others without understanding them. In some market environments, this 
type of behavior is rampant. Due to the reception of correlated information, many investors can follow the 
trend and buy the same securities. There are two types of mimetic behavior: "fallacious imitation" and 
"intentional mimicry". The first occurs when agents hold the same information and make similar decisions, 
but independently. As for the second, it occurs when the agents intentionally imitate the behavior of other 
agents. 
- Loss aversion: According to Mickaël Mangot (2004)8: «the tendency to behave differently when one is 
in a loss or a gain state is stronger as it results from the observations of a loss aversion which makes 
individuals consider them twice as painful as the gains are pleasant. » He adds that this discovery goes 
back to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky who have treated the basics of perspective theory that explains 
the rules of decision-making in risky environments. Loss aversion explains why investors tend to keep losing 
stocks, because if they sell them to buy another one, and   they gain less value, they will only receive half of 
the disappointment caused by the loss of the first stock. Loss aversion is probably the most fundamental 
concept to account for stock market behavior. It is a behavior that attests the almost unanimous resistance to 
take losses and impatience to realize its gains. The investor, for an amount, gives up investing because he 
believes that for the same title/stock, even if the expectation of earnings is clearly positive, there is possibility 
to lose. The investor in this case of behavior, also thinks that it is wise to quickly take gains on the stock 
market because the moods of the market change very quickly. Once purchased, the investor no longer follows 
the news of his title/stock, and this is also the case of the securities that were failed to buy. 
-Mental accounting: Thaler in 1985 defines mental accounting as the tendency of individuals to classify 
goods in different mental compartments. Individuals focus primarily on the relevance of each individual 
decision and do not care about the consequences of their decisions. They create for each good a mental account 
to which they assign a code. In mental accounting, the criterion that individuals take into consideration is the 
utility provided by this good. Thaler in 1985 identifies two types of utility: the acquisition utility that measures 
the utility of a good in relation to its purchase price and the transaction utility that measures the difference 
between the purchase price and the reference price set by the individual. In the case of transactional utility, 
the individual buys the good only when the price to be paid is less than or equal to the reference price. To 
study the effects of mental accounting, Shefrin and Thaler (1988) proposed a classification of US household 
income according to the criterion of the availability of money. They showed that incomes are classified 
separately into three different mental accounts: the current wage (current assets account: money in hand and 
chequing account); investment income (the current assets account: savings account, booklets, etc.); future 
income that is used to prepare for retirement. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) added that individuals spend money 
differently according to the category in which they associate it with. They showed that for the current asset 
group, the average proportion to spend is close to 1 while it is almost 0 for the third category. Every dollar in 
the first category is spent while every dollar in the last category is definitely saved (until retirement). In the 
financial markets, investors decide for each security taken individually instead of taking the entire situation 
into account as to its final use. An investor who negotiates separately titles can be led to sub-optimal portfolio 
diversification and therefore to underestimate its performance (Bouattour, 2012)9. Shefrin and Statman (2000), 
developing Behavioral Portfolio Theory, provided an explanatory framework of investment choices that are 
totally different from those of the Markowitz average - variance model (1952). The behavioral portfolio theory 
explains how investors build their portfolios. According to these authors, the asset portfolio takes the form of 
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a pyramid and adapts with the behavior of an investor who follows the concept of mental accounting, which 
is the management of portfolio. Investors have a mental account for each investment objective so that the 
overall portfolio is formed from the piling up of mini- portfolios determined by their expected level of risk 
and gain. These mini-portfolios are not optimal in the sense of Markowitz (1952) and the correlation between 
different mental accounts is also neglected. 
-The status-quo bias: 
Mangot (2004) defines the status-quo bias as paralysis in the decision. It is the tendency to leave things as 
they are or unchanged as the decision to change appears as a source of risk more than as a source of benefits. 
Several areas state that the adoption of this bias implies choices that are not that rational. As humans, we often 
feel apprehensive about change, which leads us to make choices that ensure things stay the same, or change 
as little as possible. When an investor makes a decision in his own interest, he will tend to do nothing because 
of the status-quo bias. Financial actors prefer to keep the investments that already belong to them. Deciding 
to change investment shows that previous investment decisions were bad choices."This is especially the case 
when stock prices go down. The status-quo bias implies preferring the default choice, which is often a no- 
action option "(Douret, 2015). Shafir and Tversky (1992) in one study concluded that while the number of 
attractive alternatives is high, this implies a delay in decision- making. In other words, when the investor is 
faced with several investment choices, the decision-making task can become overwhelming. As a result, some 
investors prefer to refrain from any changes. 
2. Methodology: 
The purpose of this article is to determine the psychological biases that influence investors' decisions on the 
Moroccan stock market. We opted for a quantitative study based on a questionnaire. Regarding the selection 
of the sample, the method of judged choices was used to determine the sample of portfolio managers of the 
equity securities    of the management companies and the method of sampling networks or snowball for traders 
of the Moroccan stock market. These methods allowed us to choose very precisely the elements of the sample, 
while respecting the criteria that were set in this research. The choice of the sample is motivated by the weight 
of the operations carried out by these investors in the Moroccan market. 
In fact, according to AMMC 1 figures for the first quarter of 2015, the volume of purchases and sales made 
by mutual funds and individuals reaches 35% and 10% respectively of the Moroccan stock market's purchases 
shares and 31% and 10% respectively of sales shares in the same market. This reflects their influence on the 
Moroccan stock market and hence the interest of their choice in this study. 
The goal, as mentioned earlier, is to determine the psychological biases that influence investors when making 
decisions. for this purpose, we contacted 45 people to answer our questionnaire and relied on the website of 
the AMMC (Autorité marocaine des marchés de capitaux) (Moroccan Authority of Capital Markets) to 
determine all management companies operating in Morocco. Regarding Moroccan individual traders, we 
relied on the network of a trader in the Casablanca Stock Market by putting the snowball method into practice 
to reach other traders. The questionnaire administered for the collection of information was structured in such 
a way as to allow us to know and to detect the socio-professional characteristics of the managers (age, type 
and level of training, experience ...), as well as the behavioral biases involved in managing the portfolios. The 
studied biases are: loss aversion, sheep behavior, overconfidence, mental accounting, anchoring, cultural bias 
and representativeness, all of which are measured by 5-point Likert scales or scenarios. After administering 
the questionnaire, we ended up using 30 questionnaires only, since the rest of the resource persons contacted 
refused to answer them, which gives us a response rate of 66% of the chosen statistical universe. For the 
collection of answers, we used several modes of administration, namely the direct administration and the face-
to-face interviews, questionnaires filled by telephone and questionnaires filled by e-mail. 
Processing the collected data: 
As for the analysis of the data, the exploitation and the interpretation of the collected data were carried out by 
means of SPHINX, SPSS and Smart PLS software. The first analysis carried out is the validity test in order 
to verify whether the purpose of the instrument is the same as that fixed for the study. In other words, it is a 
                                                     
1 The AMMC is the Moroccan authority for capital markets. Its role is to protect savings invested in financial instruments, ensure equal treatment of 
savors, transparency and integrity of the capital market and investors’ information; Ensure the proper functioning of the capital market and ensure the 
application of legislative and regulatory provisions; Ensure the control of the activity of the various organizations and persons under its control; ; 
Ensure respect to the current legislation and regulations relating to the fight against money laundering, by the persons and the organisms under its 
control; Contribute to the promotion of the financial education of savers; Assist the government in capital market regulation. 
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matter of judging the relevance and the validity of the measuring instrument used. The validity of the construct 
is usually used if the study is about an abstract domain that is difficult to specify. It is defined by two concepts; 
the validity of convergence and the validity of divergence. The validity of convergence (Midi, 1996) indicates 
that the measurement of a construct is independent from the measurement process that has been followed. 
That is to say, that two measurements by different instruments of the same concept must lead to the same 
result. The technical principle is based on a correlation calculation between the results of the study to be 
validated and the results of a valid study on the same field. Both instruments are used simultaneously on the 
target population. We, then, test the hypothesis according to which the results of the study to be validated are 
correlated with the results of the reference study. The divergence validity (Midy, 1996)14 verifies that the 
measured construct does not overlap with another existing construct. In this case, either the two constructs 
actually concern the same domain and they are, therefore, redundant or they do not cover it. In this case one 
of the two constructs is poorly specified. The technique is based on the same principle of correlation, but from 
a valid study on a different field. Afterwards, we test the hypothesis according to which there is no correlation 
between the two results. The second test is of reliability. Validity is a necessary but insufficient condition to 
justify the relevance of a questionnaire. After ensuring that we are targeting the right target, we must be able 
to reach it on a regular basis. Concerning reliability, when the random measurement error is small, the 
measurement is said to be reliable. The reliability of a measuring instrument determines its ability to reproduce 
the same results if it is administered several times to the same population. To test reliability, we refer to 
Cronbach's alpha parameter, which measures the internal consistency of the items that make up each 
dimension in the concepts. 
Recall that in this research we decided to study the psychological biases influencing the decision-making of 
investors in equity securities.  The analysis of the relations between the variables of our model will be made 
by the recourse to the models of the structural equations. This latter allows on the one hand to validate the 
measurements, and on the other hand to study the relationships between the variables of a model. The 
modeling of structural relationships is done by linking unobservable constructs; it includes several statistical 
approaches, including the PLS (Partial Least Squares) iterative models. It is an iterative algorithm with an 
alternate estimate of latent variables as a function of each sub- model. In other words, it allows the estimation 
of complex causal relationships between latent variables measured through observed variables called manifest. 
In this study, there will be a set of constructs or indicators that help explain the influence of the latent construct 
and determine their impact on decision-making. In this case, our measurement model is part of a reflective 
logic. the validity of the measurement model will be, therefore, ensured by studying the convergent validity 
and the discriminant validity of the items and then studying the reliability of the concepts and the measuring 
instrument. Below is the proposed research model for studying the link between the different psychological 
biases called indicators and the latent construct -namely, decision-making- and using the PLS approach. This 
latter represents a tool adapted to the relational model test targeted by this research. The table below presents 
all the variables: explained and explanatory. 
Table 1. Synthesis of Variables in the Econometric Model 
Entitled Code Nature 
Decision making PD Explained Variable 
Cultural bias C Explanatory variable 
Status quo bias STAT Explanatory variable 
Representativeness bias REP Explanatory variable 
The mimetic behavior MOUT Explanatory variable 
Mental accounting CM Explanatory variable 
Loss aversion A Explanatory variable 
Overconfidence bias EC Explanatory variable 
The anchoring bias ANC Explanatory variable 
Risk taking PR Explanatory variable 
Source:  
The following equation system materializes the econometric model used as a test for the structure model. 
                        (1) 
 
ܲݎ݅ݏ݁ ݀݁ ݀éܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ = ߙ1 + ߙ2. ܣ + ߙ3. ܧܥ + ߙ4. ܣܰܥ + ߙ5. ܵܶܣܶ + ߙ6. ܥܯ +
+ߙ7. ܯܱܷܶ + +ߙ8. ܥܯ + ߙ9. ܥ + ߙ10. ܴܲ + ߙ11. ܩ + ߙ12. ܪܫ + ߙ13. ܣܩܧ + +ߙ14. ܧܯ +
ߙ15. ܨܱܴ + +ߙ16. ܦܫܲ + ߙ17. ܧܺܲ + ߙ18. ܫܰܨ + ߙ19. ܶܣ + ߝ 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model of the proposed research made by the author using the Smart software PLS 2. 
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3. Results and analyzes 
3.1. Model adjustments and explanatory analysis. The table below summarizes the results of 
validity and reliability tests using exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis, 
respectively. 
The first AFE analysis makes it possible to clear descriptive information.  In this phase, the goal is to 
test the validity and reliability of the concepts and the measuring instrument. In fact, the factorial 
analysis of the correspondence makes it possible to eliminate the items which are badly represented 
during the extractionThe aforementioned decision rule states that the construct will be considered to 
have a "good" convergent validity when the correlation coefficients between its dimensions are positive 
and statistically significant, and when the factorial axis shares with its dimensions are at least half of 
the variations (while accepting the factorial transformation by a value at least equal to 0.5). Regarding 
reliability, the construct will be considered reliable through the internal consistency of the scale by the 
Cronbach's Alpha index which must be greater than 0.7. The analysis of the results by the concept of 
decision making will start. It was operationalized using 4 items. The exploratory factor analysis showed 
that even with the two remaining items, it is impossible to operationalize this concept. The result shows 
a 25% variability of the two items with insufficient internal consistency displaying a Cronbach’s Alpha 
of 0.40. The second concept is that of information as we operationalized it with 9 items of which 4 
are considered representative of the concept. Loss aversion, as for it and with the 4 items attributed 
to it of which 2 kept after the extraction of the components, was poorly represented since the quality 
of the representation is below the threshold of 0.5 and the Cronbach's alpha is 0.39. The results of 
the extraction of the components of other constructs, namely the anchoring bias, the status-quo 
bias, the perception of risk and the mental accounting, also showed that their items were poorly 
represented. The overconfidence bias, and with these 11 items, can be operationalized with 4 items 
that show a total explained variance of 60.07% and a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.7. This is the same 
case for the sheep behavior that was operationalized using 7 items and the representativeness bias 
with its 6 items and whose extraction revealed that the items kept after extraction that were 2 and 
4 respectively are representative of concepts. In fact, the results show percentages of variability of 
66.77% and 50.99% respectively and Cronbach's alpha of 0.78 and 0.80 respectively. As the 
exploratory factor analysis remains insufficient to validate this research model, and since it is based 
on descriptive methods, it must be complemented by a more robust confirmatory factor analysis. 
A reminder, in the AFC, we test the validity and reliability of the concepts and the instrument with 
explanatory methods. We examine the convergent validity by the Average Variance Explain 
(AVE), this indicator must be at least equal to 0.5: which means that the construct shares more than 
50% of its variance with its measurements. In other words, the measurement indicators account for 
a very large part of the variance of the construct. AFC also allows us to examine the divergent or 
discriminating validity that represents the ability of a measure to generate results different from the 
measures of the other constructs. Confirmatory factorial analysis also allows the reliability or 
consistency of the measuring instrument to be examined on the basis of the Cronbach’s alpha index, 
which must be greater than 0.7, and the Composite Reliability Index which also must be greater 
than 0.5. The role of reliability is to determine if the scale of measurement will not be biased if we 
repeat the study several times and if we change the structure of the sample. this study shows that 
the AVE is greater than 0.5 for all the variables, which explains the consistency between the items 
and their variables. In fact, the value of the AVE of the different concepts varies between 0.51 and 
1. The composite reliability index which provides additional support for reliability is also greater 
than 0.5 for all the variables, and its value varies between 0.61 and 1. Finally, Cronbach's Alpha 
also respects the condition, but not for all variables, since loss aversion, anchor bias, and mental 
accounting display values less than 0.7. From the results obtained, we can confirm the quality of 
the measuring instruments used to study the explanatory variables and the variables explained. 
After having tested the reliability and the validity of each selected dimension, we can finally 
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summarize the results obtained in the table below, and present our validated research model under 
Smart PLS. 
Table 2. Synthesis of assessment of the quality of measurement scales 
Variables Items code Number of items selected AVE Cronbach’s Alpha 
Decision making Prise de décision 1 1 1 
Informations Nat info 1 1 1 
Loss aversion A2 
A3 
2 0.51 0.16 
Overconfidence EC2 EC3 EC4 EC5 
EC8 
4 0.62 0.85 
Anchoring bias ANC2 
ANC3 
2 0.51 0.05 
The mimetic behavior MOUT4 
MOUT6 
2 0.87 0.85 
Mental accounting CM1 
CM2 
1 0.55 0.19 
Representativeness bias REP1 REP2 REP4 REP5 
REP6 
4 0.56 0.81 
Status quo bias STAT2 
STAT3 
2 0.80 0.78 
Risk taking Prise de ris 1 1 1 
Cultural bias C2 
C4 C5 
3 0.68 0.81 
We note that the conditions required to validate our measurement model seem to be assured as well as a 
homogeneity of the scales. Especially since the convergent and divergent validity of all scales of 
measurement that have been proposed shows significant results. We were able to set our measurement 
model which represents all the explanatory variables. The figure below shows the measurement model 
that was designed with SMART PLS software. 
 
Figure 2. Measurement model adjusted by SMAT PLS software 
3. Evaluation of the structural model: empirical validation of the hypothesis 
3.2. Presentation of models for evaluating the quality of the structural model. After having verified the 
validity and the reliability of the scales of measurement, we will focus now on the study of the causal relation 
between the different variables of this study. the goal is to check whether or not there is a relationship between 
psychological biases and decision-making. The purpose is to confirm or refute this relationship among 
investors of equity securities in Morocco. This study is known as the validation of the structural model. To do 
so, we analyzed the links between the measurement indicators   and the constructs. This is a vital approach 
that will allow us to validate our hypothesis.    In this sense, we proceed to confirm the latter on the basis of 
the importance of the significance of the structural relationships obtained. Using the PLS method, the quality 
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of the structural model is measured by a coefficient of determination R², it informs on the contribution of 
each explanatory variable to predict the explained variable. In other words, this coefficient makes it possible 
to study the proportion of the variance of Y that can be predicted by the function X. Since this coefficient 
alone does not allow us to measure the quality of the measurement model, we found it advisable to accompany 
it by determining the coefficients of the β paths, also known as structural coefficients or standardized 
regression coefficients. These coefficients make it possible to determine the degree of importance of the 
effects that can be measured by them. It clarifies the meaning and strength of the relationship between the 
predicted variable and the predicator. Its value varies between -1 and 1 and the closer it is to 0, the more 
the relationship is considered less strong. When the value is positive, it means that the two variables vary in 
the same direction. If not, it means that the variables vary in the opposite direction. This coefficient is 
determined by the Bootstrap method which aims at maximizing the variable explained by the explanatory 
variables. After the determination of the two coefficients of determination R² and the coefficients of the paths 
β, comes the step of calculating the statistical significance of the values and which is counted by the Student 
test thanks to the Bootstrap method. The purpose of this test is to estimate a structural model that allows us to 
determine the relations that are supposed to exist between the latent constructs using the two coefficients and 
the Student test that we presented previously. The importance of the significance of the relations obtained will 
confirm or invalidate our hypothesis. Below are the results obtained using the Smart PLS logician: 
Table 3. Synthesis of assessment of the quality of measurement scales 
Variables Coefficient β Variance R² T student Significance of effects 
Decision making  0.92   
Explanatory variables 
Loss aversion 0.715  2.78 p = 0.01*** 
Overconfidence 0.508  2.46 p = 0.05** 
Anchoring bias -0.486  3.51 p = 0.01*** 
Mimetic behavior -0.188  1.71 p = 0.1* 
Mental accounting 0.183  1.56 Not significant 
Representativness bias -0.410  0.98 Not significant 
Status quo bias -1.253  3.99 p = 0.01*** 
Risk taking -0.518  3.36 p = 0.01*** 
Cultural bias -0.796  1.83 p = 0.1* 
* : sig at the thresholdde 10% ;   ** : sig at the thresholdde de 5% ;   *** :  sig at the thresholdde 1% 
From the table above, we can determine the relationships and structural links that explain the impact of the 
psychological biases on decision-making among portfolio managers of equity securities. When reading the 
table, we find that the β pat coefficients take positive and other negative values. Decision-making is explained 
by the explanatory variables that display a positive β coefficient, namely loss aversion (β = 0.715), 
overconfidence (β = 0.508) and mental accounting (β = 0.183). This explains why these variables have a very 
strong linear relationship with decision-making, while other explanatory variables display negative values, 
which explains their negative impact on decision-making. It includes anchoring bias, sheep behavior, 
representativeness bias, status-quo bias, risk taking and cultural bias. Similarly, for control variables, those 
with a very strong linear relationship to decision-making are age, diploma and type of analysis, while the rest 
of the control variables have a negative impact on decision-making. The T analysis of Student has positive 
and very significant values concerning all the psychological biases that affect decision-making. Thus, we find 
that most values are greater than 1.64 with a significant probability of the order of 0.1 with the exception of 
the representativeness bias that displays a value of 0.98 and the mental accounting bias that displays the value 
of 1.56. This means that the representativeness bias has no impact on the decision-making of portfolio 
managers of equity securities in Morocco. Regarding the psychological biases that affect decision-making the 
most, we have the status-quo bias (T = 3.99), followed by anchoring bias (T = 3.51), loss aversion (T = 2.78), 
overconfidence (T = 2.46) etc. As for the bias control, we can conclude that those who have an impact on 
decision-making are the investment horizon, age, experience and training. 
The analysis of the coefficient of determination R² for the whole results emanating from our analysis is of 
0.92 which explains that all the studied variables, namely the psychological biases, the information, the 
diploma, the experiment etc, explain 92% of   the variance of the variable explained which is the decision-
making. While psychological biases alone can explain 77% of the decision-making. We can emphasize that 
this result confirms the existence of the psychological biases that intervene and affect the decision- making 
process of managers of portfolio securities in Morocco. Every human being has the mental shortcuts they use 
when making decisions and Moroccan portfolio managers are no exception. The difference that exists is that 
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among these biases, there are those that can affect positively like loss aversion, decision-making, and others 
that may negatively affect it such as herding behavior, cultural bias, anchoring bias etc. Even the cultural bias 
that we have added that is not part of the psychological biases in theory influences the decision-making of 
portfolio managers in Morocco. 
We can thus conclude that the psychological biases that influence the decision-making of the managers of 
equity securities are: anchoring bias, status-quo bias, sheep behavior, mental accounting, cultural bias, 
overconfidence bias and loss aversion, with the exception of representativeness bias that does not occur in the 
study sample. 
Conclusion 
For several decades, financial theory had been built around the assumption of the economic rationality of 
agents. It was based on three fundamental elements, namely: the maximization of utility expectancy, the 
assumption of market efficiency and the absence of arbitrage opportunity. These three pillars have led to a 
deeper understanding of the functioning of markets, price developments and valuation of financial assets. 
Portfolio management models were subsequently developed, based on portfolio theory and valuation models 
for derivative assets. They represent a proof for the theoretical advances, but also for the transfer to the 
professional world of university researches15. From the 1950s, several troubling findings emerged, leading 
to the questioning of the theory of the efficiency of the financial markets. Investors do not look like "homo 
economicus" who are described as intelligent economic agents capable of making rational choices without 
being influenced by their emotions. Even more so, experimental observations have undermined the relevance 
of the axioms of the theory of the expectancy of utility. Thus, defenders of classical finance have become 
incapable of neglecting the many criticisms that have been addressed to them, and how the agents formulate 
their choices instead of using assumptions that specify how they should behave. This is how behavioral finance 
caused a lot of ink flow. Especially since events have occurred and have increased the attractiveness of this 
new approach such as the bursting of the internet bubble in 2000, the awarding of the Nobel Prize in economics 
to Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith in 2002 who developed the theory of perspectives. The latter relates 
the impact of psychological biases on the decision-making of economic agents when they face risky choices. 
Numerous studies have challenged the theory of utility expectancy and led to the emergence of alternative 
approaches such as the one proposed by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979. These works exceed the scope of 
finance and lays the foundation for an alternative financial theory in which individual behavior is no longer 
rational. The goal of behavioral finance was to find insights into the many market phenomena or portfolio-
choice behaviors that are referred to as biases or anomalies. Behavioral finance is a new stream of research 
based on the psychology of the investor. This current is based on fundamental points in particular, the limit 
of the rationality of the investor and the influence of the decisions by the beliefs and the emotions. This means 
that individuals use reasoning shortcuts called heuristics in their information processing process. 
In this article, the goal is to detect the existence of behavioral biases and determine their impact on the 
decisions made by investors. We relied on a quantitative study that was conducted on a sample of 30 people 
composed of traders and portfolio managers of equity securities training in management companies in 
Morocco. In fact, several studies of this kind have been carried out to detect these psychological biases. The 
first study is of Kahneman and Tversky in 1974. Through their research, they were able to deduce that the 
agents do not have the cognitive capacities to be able to make their decisions on the financial markets and in 
a rational way. These individuals operate shortcuts of reasoning to simplify reality and create more 
comprehensible models. The main heuristics that have been studied are representativeness, anchoring and 
availability. Debondt and Thaler had studied the impact of overconfidence on decision-making. According to 
them, investors who tend to overstate their abilities and knowledge underestimate the risk it takes with their 
decisions. Another study, of Fried et al in 1970, states that in the case of lack of confidence, managers tend to 
follow the strategy of the most successful person among them. This trend is even more accentuated when 
managers are paid according to their performance. As for our study, the results obtained are that managers of 
securities portfolios and traders are influenced by the psychological biases during their decision- making 
process, including anchoring bias, status-quo, sheep behavior, mental accounting loss aversion etc. Especially 
the cultural bias, since it has never been treated before and is a product of our Moroccan culture and very 
present and has an impact on decision- making. In addition, the research model we have constructed has shown 
that the psychological biases that were studied with the exception of representativeness bias influence 77% of 
investors' decision-making. 
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